

first in **safety**

safety instrumented system - HIPPS

## Introduction to HIPPS

HIPPS is an abbreviation of “High Integrity Pressure Protection System”. HIPPS systems are applied to prevent over-pressurisation of a plant by shutting-off the source of the high pressure. In traditional systems over-pressure is dealt with through relief systems. Relief systems have obvious disadvantages such as release of (flammable and toxic) process fluids in the environment and often a large footprint of the installation. With the increasing environmental awareness relief systems are no longer an acceptable solution.

HIPPS provides a technically sound and economically attractive solution to protect equipment in cases where:

- High-pressures and / or flow rates are processed
- The environment is to be protected.
- The economic viability of a development needs improvement
- The risk profile of the plant must be reduced

HIPPS is an instrumented safety system that is designed and built in accordance with the IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 standards.

## What is HIPPS?

The international standards IEC 61508 and 61511 refer to safety functions and Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) when discussing a device to protect equipment, personnel and environment.

Older standards use terms like safety shut-down systems, emergency shut-down systems or last layers of defence. A system that closes the source of over-pressure within 2 seconds with at least the same reliability as a safety relief valve is usually called a HIPPS.

A High Integrity Pressure Protection System is a complete functional loop consisting of:

- The sensors, (or initiators) that detect the high pressure
- The logic solver, which processes the input from the sensors to an output to the final element
- The final elements, that actually perform the corrective actions in the field by bringing the process to a safe state. The final element consists of a valve, actuator and possibly solenoids.



*Flaring of hydrocarbons causes damage to the environment and the CO<sub>2</sub> production is not in line with the Kyoto Protocol.*




*HIPPS prevent over-pressurization by shutting down the source of the high pressure.*

## Standards & Design Practices

The ever-increasing flow rates in combination with the environmental constraints initiated the wide-spread and rapid acceptance in the last decades of HIPPS as the ultimate protection system.


The International Electro technical Commission (IEC) introduced the IEC 61508 and the IEC 61511 standards in 1998 and 2003. These are performance based, non-prescriptive, standards which provide a detailed framework and a life-cycle approach for the design, implementation and management of safety systems applicable to a variety of sectors with different levels of risk definition. These standards also apply to HIPPS.



The IEC 61508 mainly focuses on Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Safety-related systems. However it also provides a framework for safety-related systems based on other technologies including mechanical systems. The IEC 61511 was introduced by the IEC specifically for designers, integrators and users of safety instrumented systems and covers the other parts of the safety loop (sensors and final elements) in greater in detail.

The basis for the design of safety instrumented system is the required Safety Integrity Level (SIL). The SIL is obtained during the risk analysis of the plant or process and represents the required risk reduction. The SIS shall meet the requirements of the applicable SIL level which ranges from 1 to 4. The IEC standards define the requirements for each SIL level for the lifecycle of the equipment, including design and maintenance. The SIL level also defines a required Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) for the complete loop and architectural constraints for the loop and its different elements.

In practice the required protection level for HIPPS in Oil and Gas applications is often SIL3. But this is not cast in stone and should always be the result of a Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP). The requirements of the HIPPS system should not be simplified to a PFD level only, the qualitative requirements and architectural constraints form an integral part of the requirements to an instrumented protection system such as HIPPS.



A typical HIPPS safety loop consisting of 2oo3 pressure transmitters, a logic solver and 2 final elements being valve and actuator.



The European standard EN12186 (DIN G491) and more specific the EN14382 (DIN 3381) has been used for many years in (mechanically) instrumented overpressure protection systems. These standards prescribe the requirements for the over-pressure protection systems, and their components, in gas plants. Not only the response time and accuracy of the loop but also safety factors for over-sizing of the actuator of the final element are dictated by these standards. Independent design verification and testing to prove compliance to the EN14382 standard is mandatory. Therefore users often refer to this standard for HIPPS design. The German DVGW certified the Mokveld final element including a mechanical pressure switch in 1974 in accordance with DIN3381 (now EN14382). Since that date Mokveld has field experience with safety shut-off valves (with actuator and sensor) closing within 2 seconds.

## Reliability


Mokveld's vast experience in fast stroking final elements totals over of 19.000 operational years. The Mokveld final elements (a functional unit consisting of valve + actuator + solenoid or pressure switch) are therefore "proven in use" for high reliability safety applications in natural gas and 2-phase hydrocarbons. Third parties, like the German TÜV, have certified the Mokveld database and the derived reliability data, this includes failure rates for clean (treated) and unclean (untreated, close to the wellhead) fluids.

The certified Mokveld failure rate for the final element (being the valve + actuator) for a failure to deliver a full stroke in 2 seconds for applications in untreated hydrocarbons is:  $\lambda = 2,98 \times 10^{-4}$  / year. The failure rate for the Mokveld mechanical pressure switch (sensor) mounted on the final element is:  $\lambda = 1,96 \times 10^{-3}$  / year. This data enables Mokveld to propose a HIPPS to suit SIL 3 or even SIL 4 with a proof test interval of 1 year or a system fully in accordance with EN12186 or EN14382.

The Mokveld final elements do not require additional electronic systems, like partial stroke testing, to meet SIL 3 with a 1 year test interval. A separate technical datasheet on this subject is available.

SIL Safety Integrity Level	PFD Probability of Failure on demand
4	$\geq 10^{-5}$ to $< 10^{-4}$
3	$\geq 10^{-4}$ to $< 10^{-3}$
2	$\geq 10^{-3}$ to $< 10^{-2}$
1	$\geq 10^{-2}$ to $< 10^{-1}$

*The corresponding PFD to each SIL. The required redundancy is not shown here.*



An example of how and where HIPPS can be implemented in, typical production facility.


## Initiators / Sensors

The initiators / sensors detect the high pressure (or high level, or temperature). These may be the Mokveld mechanical pressure switches or specific safety related pressure transmitters. The safety loop may consist of one or more sensors to achieve the required safety level.

The Mokveld pressure switches are certified to DIN 3381 and have a setpoint accuracy better than 1% of the setpoint. Both the pneumatic and the hydraulic switch are certified in accordance with the EN14382 and third party validated reliability data is available. The safety systems based on these switches are easily identifiable in the plant, easy to operate and relatively simple. This makes it inherently safe systems. Based on the Mokveld pressure switch a stand-alone HIPPS, requiring no external energy, is available for applications in remote areas.



HIPPS with two Mokveld pressure switches protecting Shell Tutong metering station in Brunei.



Instrumentation schematic of a HIPPS consisting of 2 final elements each having two pressure switches. Testing can be done via the high integrity manifold block with key interlock system.



## Logic Solver


The Logic Solver processes the signals from the sensors and closes the final element for instance by de-energising the solenoids. A systems based on pressure switches does not require a separate logic solver.

A SIS or HIPPS utilising pressure transmitters and a logic solver are typically used when remote sensing is required. Usually 3 pressure transmitters are used and the Logic Solver de-energises the solenoids when 2 give a high signal (2 out of 3 voting). The logic solver is probably the most complex device in the loop, especially the programmable ones. At present many are available with certificates showing suitability in SIL 3 safety loops. In general Mokveld uses hard-wired solid-state logic solvers based on the magnetic core technology. These systems are inherently fail-safe and are therefore certified for applications in SIL 4 loops.


## Final Element

The IEC 61508 does not give the final elements the attention they deserve, the IEC 61511 already has more focus on this part of the loop. Whereas this is specifically required for fast acting safety loops (requiring shut-off within 2 seconds) in a low demand mode. The EN12186 recognises this and refers to the EN14382 for the design of the final element.

Slam-shut valves in HIPPS applications usually have long periods of inactivity (valve remains fully open for a long period). The design shall be such that this does not influence the response time of the valve, nor the stroking speed once a demand occurs. A regular partial stroking cycle is not a solution as this may result in a partial closure upon a demand as well.



Typical logic solver panel.




Mokveld engineering assistance will provide a fault tree analysis of your system during proposal stage.

The following features make the Mokveld axial on-off valve inherently safe and suitable for HIPPS applications:

- The break-away thrust is minimal, even after long periods of inactivity.
- Erosion and subsequent degradation into leak tightness is avoided.
- The required actuator thrust is low and independent of the pressure differential across the valve.
- Very short stroking times (e.g. 2 seconds for 24 inch valves) are possible due to the low mass of the moving parts.
- The piston does not slam onto the seat but slides into the seat.
- The integrated design of valve and actuator assures that the thrust safety margin is sufficient at all times.

Please refer to the Mokveld axial on-off valve brochure for more detailed explanation of the specific benefits.



Mokveld can assist in defining the response time of your system in the proposal stage.

## Mokveld Engineering Assistance


Mokveld engineers can provide support in an early phase of the project. We can assist in defining suitable HIPPS architecture, fault tree analysis, determining the pressure rise in the protected volume and the required stroking times and set points of the entire system.

For further  
information  
contact:

**Mokveld Valves BV**  
[www.mokveld.com](http://www.mokveld.com)

Copyright  
© Mokveld Valves,  
The Netherlands.  
June 2008

# global network - supported locally



## Mokveld Offices

- 1 Mokveld Valves BV
- 2 Mokveld Valves Inc
- 3 Mokveld UK Ltd
- 4 Mokveld Norge AS
- 5 Mokveld GmbH
- 6 Mokveld Marketing JV
- 7 Mokveld Valves BV, Middle East
- 8 Mokveld Valves BV, Asia Pacific
- 9 Mokveld Valves BV, China
- 10 Mokveld Valves BV, Algeria

## Adresses

**Gouda, The Netherlands**  
Houston (Tx), United States of America  
Cirencester, United Kingdom  
Stavanger, Norway  
Wesel, Germany  
Sumy, Ukraine  
Dubai, United Arab Emirates  
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia  
Beijing, the People's Republic of China  
Alger, Algeria

## E-mail

**info@mokveld.com**  
usa@mokveld.com  
uk@mokveld.com  
norge@mokveld.com  
germany@mokveld.com  
mokveld.marketing@mokveld.com  
mideast@mokveld.com  
asiapacific@mokveld.com  
china@mokveld.com  
algeria@mokveld.com